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In this view, then, the perceptual categories for individual let-
ters and words are structured in accordance with background
knowledge. Various findings such as the word superiority and
phoneme restoration effects have been described as compatible
with the view that the relevant perceptual systems are encapsu-
lated, because the top-down influences may occur within the
module. However, as the above evidence indicate, the perceptual
representations of words that might support these effects are lo-
cated outside the putative early visual system.
I do not mean to suggest that these findings are incompatible
with Pylyshyn’s main thesis that early vision is informationally en-
capsulated. But the findings do restrict the types of computations
that such a system may perform. At least in the domain of read-
ing, the perceptual categories for words (and letters) reside out-
side the early visual system, and it remains to be seen whether
other categories, such as structural descriptions of objects are
completely determined on the basis of visual information, or
whether nonvisual sources of evidence constrain this knowledge
as well.
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Abstract: We amplify possible complications to the tidy division between
early vision and later categorisation which arise when we consider the per-
ception of human faces. Although a primitive face-detecting system, used
for social attention, may indeed be integral to “early vision,” the relation-
ship between this and diverse other uses made of information from faces
is far from clear.
Zenon Pylyshyn is to be congratulated for setting out so clearly his
“natural constraints” theory of early vision (EV). Here we amplify
possible complications to the tidy division between EV and later
categorisation which arise when we consider the perception of hu-
man faces.
In Note 13 (sect. 5.1), Pylyshyn raises one possible exception to
the rule that surface descriptions within EV cannot be influenced
a top-down manner. A hollow face mask, when viewed from a cer-
tain distance, will appear as a real face, with its nose nearer than
its eyes to the viewer. This categorisation overrides the assump-
tion that light tends to come from above. To be consistent with ac-
tual lighting from above, the illusory face will be seen lit from be-
low. Actually the illusion over-rides more than just apparent
direction of lighting. When the mask is seen as a face, the percept
also overrides normal constraints about the way in which an ob-
ject occludes itself when a viewer moves in front of it. When see-
ing the face, an observer moving from side to side will see the face
move to follow them in a most alarming fashion.
The illusion appears first to have been noticed by the Scottish
scientist, Sir David Brewster (see Wade 1983; and Bruce & Young,
1998, for discussion), but was popularised by psychologist Richard
Gregory (e.g., 1973) as an example par excellence of vision as hy-
pothesis-testing. The face is such a likely and important event in
the world (compared with a hollow face) that we persist in seeing
it despite the reinterpretation of other visual information that is
demanded.
However, the hollow face illusion need not necessarily result
from face-specific processing. Another constraint is satisfied by
the face over the mask – that objects in the world are normally
convex. Johnston et al. (1992) noted a similar illusion using a quite
unfamiliar convex shape – the “hollow” potato.” Hill and Bruce
(1993; 1994) set out systematically to investigate the influence of
a number of factors on the strength of the illusion. We used the
simple method of requiring participants to walk towards or away
from the mask, stopping at the point where their perception re-
versed from concave to convex (or vice versa). Their distance from
the mask at this point formed the dependent variable. We showed
that upright faces gave a stronger effect than upside-down ones or
unfamiliar shapes, which did not differ; bottom lighting gave a
stronger illusion that top lighting; and viewing with one eye gave
a stronger illusion than two – and these effects appear to be inde-
pendent. So, there seems to be a preference for convexity, but an
additional one for the face shape over other convex but unfamil-
iar configurations. Our results were consistent with the idea that
a set of independent modules (for stereo, for shape-from shading
and so forth) each fed information to a common stage where rep-
resentation of 3D surface was computed – in Marr’s terms, the
2.5-D sketch. On this model, the “familiar shape” or, perhaps “face
detection” module would access the same stage.
Is it a cop out to allow one kind of categorisation to sneak in to
affect EV in this way? Before assuming that it is only faces that
gave the advantage over all other convex shapes, we would have to
check that other kinds of object do not give the same effect. The
prediction must be that the illusion would be equally strong for an
upright or inverted hollow dog, for example, each behaving like an
inverted face – showing an influence of the convexity constraint
alone. Assuming such a result were obtained (and we hope that
someone will now feel inspired to dip their pet into liquid plaster
to find out) how does the face-detection module get in to influ-
ence EV?
There is certainly strong evidence that a face detector is innate.
Goren et al. (1975) and Johnson et al. (1991) found that minutes-
old newborn babies would follow face-like patterns more with
their face and eyes than non-face control patterns. Recent evi-
dence from our lab (Langton & Bruce, in press) and Jon Driver’s
(Driver et al., in press) suggests that faces automatically redirect
the attention of someone viewing them. Our experiments made
use of the Posner cuing paradigm, where the task is simply to re-
spond to the onset of a target located at one of four peripheral lo-
cations. Target detection was faster when the target’s appearance
was preceded by a head/eye display looking towards its location.
Moreover, the effect resembles exogenous attentional control – ef-
fects were strongest at the shortest SOA (stimulus onset asyn-
chrony) and were found even when the cues were entirely unin-
formative. So, we would argue that face-ness, perhaps associated
with information about head angle and direction of gaze, is a very
low-level property indeed.
What is much less clear, however, is the relationship between a
primitive face-detecting system, used for social attention, and the
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Figure 1 (Bowers). The visual patterns A and a each map onto
the phonological code /ei /, which results in the coactivation of A
and a each time one of the patterns is presented, via feedback. As-
sociative learning principles within the orthographic system act to
map together these coactive patterns to produce an abstract letter
code.
myriad and complex other systems involved in deciphering differ-
ent kinds of meaning from the face. Faces are not just categorised
as faces, but as male or old or pretty or intelligent-looking faces,
as the face of a pop star or of the President, as a face looking wor-
ried or content. The kinds of visual descriptions needed for these
different categorisations are very different, and there are neu-
ropsychological dissociations between different kinds of use made
of facial information. Thus identification or expression processing
may be relatively impaired or spared following different kinds of
brain injury (e.g., Young et al. 1993). The face even manages to in-
fluence speech processing, as in the McGurk effect (McGurk &
Macdonald 1976), and visual facial speech processing also doubly
dissociates from expression and identity processing (Campbell et
al. 1986). The idea that there is a modular EV stage feeding a cat-
egorical cognitive system seems too simple, and begs a number of
really interesting and difficult questions about the flexibility of
representations needed for different kinds of socially important
activity. Such distinctions go well beyond the divison between ac-
tion-oriented perception and object recognition discussed within
the target article. So, while we like Pylyshyn’s essay very much, we
feel it still involves an over-simple distinction between “seeing”
and “seeing as” (Fodor & Pylyshyn 1981) – and doesn’t say enough
about different varieties of “seeing for.”
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Abstract: Neuroscience studies show many examples of very early mod-
ulation of visual cortex responses. It is argued that such early routing is es-
sential for a rapid processing of information by the visual system.
The evidence presented in the target article for the inflexibility of
early vision is impressive but it is mostly based on results from ex-
perimental psychology. Recent work in the neurosciences reveals
that the situation is probably more complicated than argued by
Pylyshyn.
Much of the difficulty of interpretation lies with the definition
of early vision. Although Pylyshyn denies the possibility of localiz-
ing it in specific structures, section 3.2 implies that it corresponds
to information processing in the visual cortex. According to
Pylyshyn’s thesis, there should be no modulation of activity in vi-
sual cortex other than that related to spatial attention. There is
clear evidence to the contrary: many reports have established that
neuronal responses in occipital, parietal, frontal, and inferotem-
poral visual cortex of monkeys depend on the significance of the
stimulus for subsequent behavior (eye or arm movement). Signif-
icance can be attached to the orientation, the direction of move-
ment, the shape or the color of the stimulus (Chelazzi et al. 1993;
Haenny & Schiller 1988; Mottler 1994a; 1994b; Schall et al. 1995;
Treue & Maunsell 1996) or it may involve cueing through another
sensory modality (Haenny et al. 1988).
The relationship between visual perception and single cell ac-
tivity has recently been the subject of much interest. Binocular ri-
valry provides a powerful approach to this question. When two dif-
ferent stimuli are presented in each eye, monkeys, as well as
humans, experience sudden switches between the two competing
percepts. In the inferotemporal cortex and, to a lesser extent, in
lower-order visual areas, neuronal responses change dramatically
when the animal signals that its visual perception flips between the
two percepts (Leopold & Logothetis 1996; Sheinberg & Logo-
thetis 1997). Similar findings have been recently demonstrated in
the human brain: metabolic activity of occipital, temporal, and
parietal cortex appears to follow the changes in percepts without
any changes in the stimuli (Lumer et al. 1998). Such modulations
demonstrate that the neuronal firing in inferotemporal cortex
gives a closer image of the perception than of the stimulus that
triggers it, although it is not clear whether the modulations are 
driven by bottom-up or top-down processes.
Another way to define early vision is to use the temporal di-
mension. Early vision corresponds to the early parts of the re-
sponses to visual stimulation. Measurements of the latencies of
neurons to visual stimulation show substantial overlap in the dif-
ferent cortical areas of the primate. Numerous neurons in area V1
are activated later than some neurons in frontal, parietal or infer-
otemporal cortex (Nowak & Bullier 1997; Schmolesky et al. 1998).
It is therefore difficult to reduce early vision to extrastriate visual
cortex and most cortical areas contain neurons that respond early
to visual stimulation. In this respect, the results of Schall and his
collaborators are remarkable: they show that the visual responses
of neurons in the primate frontal cortex are modulated at very
short latencies (50–70 msec post stimulus) by the color of a stim-
ulus that signals whether or not it is to be the target of an eye
movement (Bichot et al. 1996). These effects are delayed by less
than 10 msec with respect to visual responses in area V1, thus
demonstrating the capacity of the decision system to influence
very early vision.
There have also been several reports of early influences of cat-
egorization on visually evoked responses in human. Thorpe and
his collaborators demonstrated that categorizing visual scenes as
containing or not containing an animal modulates the strengths of
responses as early as 150 msec after the stimulus (Thorpe et al.
1996). Recent results (Thorpe et al., personal communication)
suggest that this modulation takes place in the inferotemporal cor-
tex. Other groups have also reported early modulation of re-
sponses in inferotemporal cortex by whether or not a stimulus can
be interpreted as a human face (Bentin et al. 1996; Jeffreys 1996).
In conclusion, evidence from the neurosciences indicates that
early visual responses are strongly modulated by the intention of
the individual to make a movement to a target or by the catego-
rization of visual stimuli. Thus, at least in such experimental sit-
uations, cognition penetrates down to the earliest levels of the 
visual system to facilitate responses relevant to subsequent be-
havior. Such facilitation effects appear to be mediated by feedback
connections (Hupé et al. 1998; Lamme 1995; Lamme et al. 1998).
The probable reason for the penetrability of early vision by the
cognitive system is the visual system’s need to process information
rapidly despite the slow nature of computations by individual neu-
rons (Nowak & Bullier 1997). Together with massive parallelism,
early routing of information (i.e., penetrability) is one of the main
strategies set up by the nervous system to achieve its remarkable
capacities in the temporal domain.
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Abstract: Cognitive impenetrability is really two assertions: (1) percep-
tion and cognition have access to different knowledge bases; and (2) per-
ception does not use cognitive-style processes. The first leads to the un-
usual corollary that cognition is itself cognitively impenetrable. The
second fails when it is seen to be the claim that reasoning is available only
in conscious processing.
Pylyshyn argues that some parts of vision are not subject to the op-
eration of reasoning and problem solving – they are cognitively
impenetrable. He notes that perceptual decisions are often made
despite the observer’s knowledge that the percept must be wrong.
This makes perception irrational in Pylyshyn’s view, leading to the
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